
Fair Pay, Fair Play
11 minAligning Executive Performance and Pay
Introduction
Narrator: In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, as the global economy teetered on the brink, public outrage reached a boiling point over a seemingly galling injustice: executives at failing institutions, the very ones receiving massive taxpayer bailouts, were still collecting enormous bonuses. The situation grew so politically charged that the U.S. government appointed a "pay czar" to oversee compensation at firms receiving federal funds. This intervention highlighted a deep and persistent question at the heart of modern capitalism: How can executive pay be so disconnected from actual performance? And what can be done to fix it?
In her book, Fair Pay, Fair Play, author and compensation expert Robin A. Ferracone argues that the outrage, while justified, often misses the point. The problem isn't just about high pay; it's about misaligned pay. She cuts through the myths and political rhetoric to provide a clear, data-driven framework for analyzing, understanding, and ultimately solving the complex puzzle of executive compensation.
The Great Disconnect Between Pay and Performance
Key Insight 1
Narrator: At its core, the executive pay controversy stems from a fundamental breakdown in the link between compensation and value creation. While most people agree that high performance deserves high rewards, the system often fails to deliver on this promise. Ferracone illustrates this with a story from a decade before the 2008 crisis, proving the problem is a persistent one. A high-flying company’s compensation committee was faced with a demand from their "rock star" CEO for a massive grant of restricted stock. He had delivered strong returns, and the committee, eager to retain him, sought external advice. Ferracone’s firm was brought in and recommended a more modest, performance-contingent grant. The committee heard the advice, excused the consultant, and then proceeded to give the CEO exactly what he wanted. A year later, the company’s financial performance collapsed. The CEO was asked to resign, walking away with a massive severance package, while shareholders were left with the wreckage. This story reveals a system where pay is often tied more to executive leverage and board complacency than to sustainable, long-term performance.
Measuring What Matters with TSR and PAC
Key Insight 2
Narrator: To fix the disconnect, Ferracone argues for a new, more accurate way of measuring both performance and pay. The ultimate measure of performance, she contends, is Total Shareholder Return, or TSR. This metric, which combines stock price appreciation and dividends, reflects the total value an executive has generated for the company’s owners over time.
However, measuring pay is more complicated. The public often reacts to headline-grabbing target pay figures, which can be deeply misleading. A powerful example is the case of former General Motors CEO Rick Wagoner. In 2009, as GM was receiving a federal bailout, news reports focused on his target pay of $14.9 million, sparking public fury. Yet, because GM’s performance had collapsed, the performance-based components of his package were worthless. Ferracone’s model calculates what she calls Performance-Adjusted Compensation, or PAC, which measures the actual value of compensation an executive receives over a three-year period after performance is factored in. Wagoner’s actual PAC was only $3.3 million. The PAC methodology strips away the noise of target pay and executive discretion, revealing the true relationship between what an executive is paid and what they have delivered.
Finding the Zone of Fair Compensation
Key Insight 3
Narrator: Fair pay isn't about a single magic number; it's about a reasonable range. Ferracone introduces the concept of the "Alignment Zone," a data-driven model that plots a company’s TSR against its CEO’s PAC. The Zone represents an acceptable range of pay outcomes for a given level of performance, based on market data and the leverage built into typical pay plans. Companies that fall within this zone demonstrate a healthy relationship between performance and pay.
A company that operates consistently within this zone is VF Corporation, the parent company of brands like Wrangler, Nautica, and Vans. Over a decade, its executive compensation program showed a remarkable 83% correlation between pay and performance. The company’s pay system, which includes salary, cash incentives, and long-term equity, is designed to produce outcomes that land squarely within the Alignment Zone. Conversely, companies can fall into one of two "NOzones." The "Upper NOzone" is for companies that pay far too much for their performance, while the "Lower NOzone" is for those that pay too little. This framework provides boards and investors with a clear visual tool to diagnose whether a company’s pay is truly aligned.
Recognizing the Five Patterns of Misalignment
Key Insight 4
Narrator: When companies fall outside the Alignment Zone, they often exhibit one of five distinct patterns of misalignment. Understanding these patterns is key to diagnosing the root cause of the problem. The patterns include: * Compensation Flatliners: Pay remains largely the same regardless of whether performance is high or low. * Compensation Riskseekers: Pay is extremely sensitive to performance, creating massive upside but also significant downside. * Compensation Highfliers: Pay is consistently in the "Upper NOzone," meaning executives are overpaid at all performance levels. * Compensation Lowliers: Pay is consistently in the "Lower NOzone," meaning executives are underpaid. * Compensation Doglegs: This is the most pernicious pattern. These companies act like Riskseekers when performance is good, delivering huge payouts. But when performance is poor, the board steps in with ad hoc awards and discretionary bonuses to protect executives from the downside, creating a "heads I win, tails you don't lose" scenario.
Perhaps the most infamous example of misalignment is Tyco International under CEO Dennis Kozlowski. His compensation, driven by bonuses for acquisitions, incentivized short-term growth at any cost. The result was a culture of excess that led to financial fraud and the company’s near-collapse. After Kozlowski’s downfall, new CEO Ed Breen, with the support of his board, implemented a more reasonable, performance-based pay system. This transformed Tyco from a poster child for misalignment into a model of recovery, demonstrating that these patterns can be corrected with disciplined governance.
Exposing the Root Causes of Misalignment
Key Insight 5
Narrator: Why do so many companies get it wrong? Ferracone identifies several root causes that destroy alignment. One of the most common is aggressive target pay, where a company’s stated philosophy is to pay its executives above the market median, even for average performance. Oracle, under CEO Larry Ellison, is a prime example. The company openly states its goal is to provide above-average compensation to attract top talent, a strategy that has consistently placed its CEO pay in the "Upper NOzone."
Another major cause is peer group abuse. Companies often select a peer group of larger, higher-paying, or aspirational companies to benchmark against, which artificially inflates their own pay standards. Other causes include turbo-charged upside, where incentive plans are so highly leveraged that they encourage excessive risk-taking, and short-termism, where pay structures reward immediate gains at the expense of long-term health. These design flaws create a system where misalignment is not an accident, but an inevitable outcome.
Overcoming the Human Factor in the Boardroom
Key Insight 6
Narrator: Finally, even the best-designed systems can be undermined by human psychology. Ferracone points to several decision-making biases that plague compensation committees. A key one is asymmetric performance attribution, the tendency to attribute good performance to management’s skill but blame poor performance on external factors like a bad economy. This bias leads boards to reward success but excuse failure.
Another is peer comparison bias, where executives and board members are more concerned with their pay relative to others than with the absolute amount. A study at Harvard Business School found that most students would prefer to earn $100,000 when their peers earn $75,000, rather than earn $125,000 when their peers earn $150,000. This desire to be "above average" contributes to the constant ratcheting up of executive pay. Overcoming these biases requires a strong, independent compensation committee, objective data, and a disciplined process that holds everyone accountable.
Conclusion
Narrator: The single most important takeaway from Fair Pay, Fair Play is that achieving alignment is not about finding a perfect formula, but about committing to a transparent and disciplined process. "Fair Pay" is the outcome, but "Fair Play" is the journey. It requires boards to move beyond gut feelings and flawed assumptions, and instead ground their decisions in objective data, a clear philosophy, and a rigorous analysis of how their pay structures actually reward performance over time.
Ultimately, the book presents a powerful challenge not just to corporate boards, but to the entire investment community. For too long, the focus has been on short-term gains and quarterly earnings. Ferracone’s work provides the tools to shift that focus. The real question it leaves us with is whether shareholders will use these tools to demand what they truly deserve: not just a return on their investment, but a system built on sustainable value and genuine accountability.