
The Extremism Whack-a-Mole
11 minThe Challenge of Moderating Online Extremism
Introduction
Narrator: On February 3, 2015, the Islamic State posted a video to YouTube showing the brutal killing of a captured Jordanian pilot. The video was designed to be shocking, and it spread like wildfire. Within hours, IS sympathizers had shared it in tens of thousands of posts on Twitter, and it garnered millions of interactions on Facebook. The incident served as a horrifying wake-up call, intensifying public and governmental pressure on social media companies to take responsibility for the harmful content on their platforms. Yet, despite years of increased moderation, mass content takedowns, and account suspensions, online extremism continues to thrive. Why does this problem seem so intractable?
In her book, Safe Havens for Hate, author Tamar Mitts argues that the answer lies not within any single platform, but in the uneven digital landscape they collectively create. She reveals that the very diversity of content moderation policies across the internet is what allows extremist organizations to build "digital resilience," ensuring their survival and even strengthening their message.
The Uneven Digital Battlefield
Key Insight 1
Narrator: The core of the problem is that the online world is not governed by a single set of rules. Instead, it’s a patchwork of digital territories with vastly different laws. On one side are the tech giants like Meta, YouTube, and X, formerly Twitter. Facing immense pressure from governments, advertisers, and the public, these companies have developed extensive and increasingly restrictive content moderation policies, removing billions of posts promoting hate, extremism, and misinformation.
On the other side are smaller, less-regulated platforms like Telegram, Gab, and Rumble. These sites face far less public and regulatory scrutiny, and many have built their brands around a commitment to "free speech," resulting in much more lenient moderation. For example, while Facebook explicitly bans dangerous organizations, Gab’s terms of service state its policy is to allow all speech permitted by the First Amendment. This divergence creates a fundamental imbalance. As governments and the public focus their outrage on the largest platforms, they inadvertently create what Mitts calls "virtual safe havens"—less-moderated spaces where extremist groups can operate with relative freedom.
The Strategic Dance of Migration
Key Insight 2
Narrator: When an extremist group is banned from a major platform, it doesn't simply vanish. Instead, it engages in a strategic migration. Mitts’s research shows that these groups face a critical trade-off between "authenticity" and "impact." Mainstream platforms offer massive impact due to their large user bases, but their strict rules prevent groups from sharing their most authentic, extreme content. Fringe platforms offer total authenticity but have a much smaller audience.
Extremist organizations, therefore, don't just flee to the most lawless corners of the internet. They strategically seek out platforms that offer the best possible mix of lenient moderation and audience reach. The Islamic State provides a clear example. In the mid-2010s, IS achieved enormous reach on Twitter, amassing over 1.6 million followers and inspiring thousands of foreign fighters. However, following intense government pressure, Twitter began aggressively suspending their accounts. In response, IS didn't disappear; it migrated its core operations to Telegram. At the time, Telegram offered a large user base and a hands-off approach to moderation, making it the ideal new home to continue spreading propaganda and coordinating activities, demonstrating that migration is not a random act of desperation but a calculated strategic move.
The Backfire Effect: How Moderation Fuels Mobilization
Key Insight 3
Narrator: Perhaps the most counterintuitive finding in the book is that content moderation can sometimes backfire, inadvertently fueling radicalization. When users are banned or have their content removed, they often feel a sense of grievance and censorship. Extremist groups are masters at exploiting this frustration. They use less-moderated platforms to specifically target users who feel wronged by "Big Tech," framing moderation as a biased attack on their values.
The story of Alvin Smallberg, a conservative Trump supporter, illustrates this perfectly. Agitated by what he saw as censorship on mainstream platforms, his frustration boiled over when his own Twitter account was banned in November 2020. He migrated to Gab, a platform known for its lenient policies. There, he found a community that validated his anger and was exposed to content from the Oath Keepers, a far-right militant group. The group’s anti-government, anti-censorship narrative resonated deeply with his personal experience. He became an enthusiastic supporter, sharing their calls to "fight back" and promoting the January 6th protest that led to the U.S. Capitol attack. His journey shows how deplatforming, while cleaning up one platform, can push an aggrieved user into a digital environment where they become even more susceptible to extremist mobilization.
The Art of Disguise: Adapting the Message to Survive
Key Insight 4
Narrator: Extremist groups have also become incredibly sophisticated at adapting their messaging to survive even on the most restrictive platforms. They employ two key tactics: content adaptation and threshold evasion.
Content adaptation involves "softening" a message to comply with platform rules. The Taliban, for instance, wanted to maintain a presence on Twitter to project an image of legitimate governance after taking power in Afghanistan. To avoid being banned for glorifying violence, they strategically shifted their posts away from war-related content and towards civilian and government topics. A more deceptive form of adaptation was used by QAnon supporters. After being banned on major platforms, they expropriated the innocuous #SaveTheChildren hashtag, which was originally used by a legitimate charity. They used it to spread their core conspiracy theory about a global child-trafficking ring, making their ideology more palatable and accessible to an unsuspecting mainstream audience.
Threshold evasion is even more subtle. It involves "smuggling in" prohibited content. For example, the Islamic State has been known to embed its propaganda inside what appear to be legitimate news clips from the BBC or brand their material with Netflix logos to evade automated detection. They also add "noise" to their messages, such as using altered text like "لTQ" instead of the Arabic word for "kill," to bypass AI filters. These tactics reveal a continuous cat-and-mouse game, where extremist groups are constantly innovating to outsmart moderation systems.
The Double-Edged Sword of a United Front
Key Insight 5
Narrator: If the problem is a lack of consistent rules, is the solution to make all platforms adopt the same strict policies? This idea, known as "convergence," has gained traction through initiatives like the Christchurch Call to Action, which promotes collaboration among tech companies. Mitts’s research shows that when platforms align their policies, they are nearly 40% less likely to host official extremist accounts.
However, this solution comes with significant costs. The first is "collateral damage." In May 2020, Facebook mistakenly took down the accounts of 87 Syrian and Palestinian journalists and activists who were documenting human rights abuses, because their content was erroneously flagged as extremist propaganda. If such an error were replicated across a dozen converging platforms, their voices could be silenced entirely. The second risk is "censorship creep," where the power to moderate is misused by authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent. Governments in Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia have already passed broad laws defining online criticism as a threat to "public order," turning moderation tools into instruments of repression. A fully centralized system for controlling online speech, while effective against extremists, could become a powerful weapon against freedom itself.
Conclusion
Narrator: The single most important takeaway from Safe Havens for Hate is that content moderation cannot be viewed as a platform-by-platform issue. Online extremism is a systemic problem rooted in the interconnected, yet inconsistent, digital ecosystem. As long as there are less-moderated "safe havens" for extremists to migrate to, mobilize within, and adapt from, simply deplatforming them from one site will remain an incomplete and sometimes counterproductive solution.
The book leaves us grappling with a profound challenge for our digital society. We are caught in a difficult trade-off between the desire for open, free expression and the urgent need for safety and order. As we move into an era where generative AI can create harmful content at an unprecedented scale, the question is no longer if we should moderate, but how we can do so consistently and legitimately, without sacrificing the very freedoms we aim to protect. How do we build a safer internet without creating a global censor?