Narrator: Two sisters are in the kitchen, arguing over a single orange. Both of them want it, and neither is willing to back down. After a tense back-and-forth, they arrive at what seems like a fair and logical compromise: they cut the orange in half. The first sister takes her half, squeezes it for juice, and throws away the peel. The second sister takes her half, grates the peel for a cake she’s baking, and throws away the fruit. Both got what they asked for, but did they get what they truly wanted? This simple scenario reveals a deep flaw in how most people approach conflict and agreement. The book Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, by Roger Fisher and William Ury, argues that this common method of splitting the difference is often inefficient, unsatisfying, and leaves immense value on the table. It presents a powerful alternative, a method designed not just to reach an agreement, but to reach a better one.

Narrator: The most common form of negotiation is positional bargaining. Each side takes a position, argues for it, and makes small concessions to reach a compromise. Think of haggling over a price in a secondhand store. A shopkeeper wants $75 for a brass dish; the customer offers $15. They go back and forth—$60, $20, $50, $25—until they either meet somewhere in the middle or one of them walks away in frustration.

Fisher and Ury argue that this approach is fundamentally flawed for three reasons. First, it produces unwise agreements. When negotiators lock themselves into positions, their ego becomes identified with that position. They focus more on "winning" than on addressing the underlying concerns of both parties. This is what happened during the Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiating a nuclear test ban treaty. The Soviets agreed to three on-site inspections per year, while the U.S. insisted on ten. They became so fixated on their respective numbers that the talks collapsed, failing to address their shared interest in avoiding nuclear catastrophe.

Second, positional bargaining is inefficient. The process encourages starting with extreme positions, stubbornly holding to them, and making only small concessions, all of which wastes time and resources. Finally, it endangers relationships. Positional bargaining frames the negotiation as a contest of will, turning collaborators into adversaries. Anger and resentment often fester, making future agreements much more difficult.

Narrator: The first principle of the authors' alternative method is to separate the people from the problem. Every negotiator has two kinds of interests: in the substance of the agreement and in the relationship. A common mistake is to entangle the relationship with the problem. If someone says, "The kitchen is a mess," we might hear it as a personal attack: "You are a slob." The negotiation then becomes a defense of one's character rather than a discussion about cleaning standards.

The authors illustrate this with the story of an insurance company lawyer meeting with a state insurance commissioner. The lawyer wanted to discuss a problematic clause in a new regulation. But the commissioner, who had written the regulation, immediately became defensive. He perceived the lawyer's concerns as a personal attack on his work and fairness. He interrupted, defended his record, and ultimately dismissed the lawyer without ever addressing the substantive issue. The problem wasn't the regulation itself, but the fact that the commissioner's ego became entangled with it. To be effective, negotiators must treat the other side with respect and work to understand their perceptions, while being hard on the problem, not the people.

Narrator: The second principle, and perhaps the book's most famous idea, is to focus on interests, not positions. A position is the tangible thing you say you want. An interest is the underlying motivation—the need, desire, or fear—that makes you want it. The classic story of the two sisters and the orange perfectly illustrates this. Their shared position was "I want the orange." Their interests, however, were different and not in conflict. One wanted the juice to drink, and the other wanted the peel to bake. Had they focused on their interests, they could have both achieved 100% of what they truly needed, instead of settling for a 50% compromise on their positions.

This principle applies to even the most complex international conflicts. In the 1978 Camp David Accords, Egypt and Israel were deadlocked over the Sinai Peninsula. Israel's position was to keep part of the Sinai, which it had occupied since 1967. Egypt's position was that every inch must be returned to its sovereignty. These positions were irreconcilable. However, by looking at their underlying interests, a solution emerged. Israel's interest was security; it did not want Egyptian tanks on its border. Egypt's interest was sovereignty; it wanted to reclaim its land. The final agreement returned the Sinai to full Egyptian sovereignty (satisfying Egypt's interest) while making it a demilitarized zone (satisfying Israel's interest). They reconciled their interests instead of compromising on their positions.

Narrator: Once interests are understood, the next step is to invent options for mutual gain. Too often, negotiators assume there is a fixed pie and their job is to claim the biggest slice. This mindset stifles creativity. The authors urge negotiators to brainstorm a wide range of possibilities before making any decisions. Consider the story of a quarrel in a library. One man wanted the window open for fresh air; another wanted it closed to avoid a draft. Their positions were in direct conflict. A compromise—opening it halfway—would have left both unsatisfied. The librarian, acting as a skilled negotiator, first identified their interests (fresh air and no draft). Then, she invented an option for mutual gain: she opened a window in an adjacent room, bringing in fresh air without creating a draft.

To decide which option is best, negotiators should insist on using objective criteria. This means basing the agreement on a standard independent of the will of either side, such as market value, scientific judgment, professional standards, or law. If you are negotiating the price of a house, you can refer to recent sales of comparable homes. If you are settling an insurance claim, you can look at court precedents. Using objective criteria turns the negotiation from a battle of wills into a search for a fair and principled solution, making it easier for both sides to concede to a principle rather than to pressure.

Narrator: A common question is: what if the other side is more powerful? Fisher and Ury argue that power is not just about wealth or status. The true source of power in a negotiation is your BATNA—your Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. This is the best course of action you can take if you fail to reach an agreement. Your BATNA is your walk-away option, and the better it is, the more power you have.

Consider a small town negotiating with a large corporation that owned the town's main factory. The corporation was paying a "goodwill" fee of $300,000 a year, but the town needed more. On the surface, the corporation held all the power. But the town's leaders developed a powerful BATNA. They discovered they could legally expand the town's limits to include the factory, which would allow them to tax the corporation at a rate of $2.5 million per year. Armed with this strong alternative, the seemingly weak town was able to negotiate a new annual payment of $2.3 million. Their power came not from their size, but from the strength of their BATNA.

Narrator: What if the other side refuses to play by these rules and resorts to attacks, threats, and positional pressure? The answer is not to push back with equal force, which only leads to a stalemate. Instead, the authors recommend "negotiation jujitsu." This involves sidestepping their attack and redirecting their energy toward the problem. When they state a hard position, don't reject it. Instead, ask questions to explore the interests behind it. When they attack you personally, reframe it as an attack on the problem.

A tenant named Frank Turnbull used this method when he discovered his landlord, Mrs. Jones, had been overcharging him on his rent-controlled apartment. When he approached her, she became hostile, defensive, and accused him of being ungrateful. Instead of arguing, Frank calmly stated the facts, acknowledged her feelings, and repeatedly asked for her advice on how to solve the problem fairly. He treated her as a partner in finding a solution based on the principle of the legal rent ceiling. After several conversations, her hostility melted away, and she agreed to reimburse him fully. He changed the game from a confrontation into a collaboration.

Narrator: The single most important takeaway from Getting to YES is that negotiation should not be seen as a battle to be won, but as a shared problem to be solved. The goal is to shift the game from adversarial haggling to collaborative problem-solving, a process that produces wiser agreements efficiently and amicably.

The book concludes with a poignant story. In 1964, one of the authors was playing Frisbee with his son in a London park. A local man watched them for fifteen minutes, then walked over and asked, "Sorry to bother you. Who's winning?" In a game of catch, the question is absurd. The goal isn't for one person to win, but for both to play well together. The same is true for a good negotiation. The challenge isn't to beat the other side, but to find a better way to play the game—one that allows you to get what you deserve while also being decent. You can, the authors insist, have both.