Michael: Most people think American foreign policy is about spreading democracy or protecting human rights. What if the most effective strategy is actually the opposite? What if it's about secretly pitting our enemies against each other, making morally gray alliances, and acting like a ruthless, calculating emperor? Kevin: A ruthless emperor? That sounds… profoundly un-American. It sounds like the villain in a James Bond movie, not the leader of the free world. What on earth are you talking about? Michael: I'm talking about the core argument in a fascinating and pretty controversial book from 2010, The Next Decade by George Friedman. And to understand his argument, you have to understand him. Friedman isn't just some academic in an ivory tower. He founded Stratfor, a major private intelligence and geopolitical forecasting company. Kevin: Right, so he's a professional predictor. He gets paid to see the future. Michael: Exactly. But there's more. His family were Hungarian Jews who survived the Holocaust and fled to the U.S. as refugees. He’s seen firsthand what happens when power dynamics go horribly wrong. So when he talks about power, it’s not an abstract theory; it’s about survival. Kevin: Okay, that context definitely changes things. A background like that would give you a pretty unsentimental view of the world. It’s not about ideals; it’s about who has the leverage and who doesn't. I can see how that would lead to some… cold-blooded conclusions. Michael: That’s the perfect way to put it. And his first cold-blooded conclusion is that the United States is an empire, whether it likes it or not.

Kevin: Hold on, an 'empire'? That word is so loaded. Americans are taught from childhood that we fought a revolution to get away from an empire. We don't have colonies. We don't have a king. How can we be an empire? Michael: Friedman calls it an "unintended empire." He argues it's not something America sought, but something that happened because of its sheer power. He points out that the U.S. produces about 25 percent of the world's wealth. Our economy is like a giant whirlpool that pulls everyone in. Kevin: Can you give an example? Like how does that actually work? Michael: He gives a great one. When Americans get a taste for shrimp, fish farmers in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam completely reorient their lives and businesses to supply that demand. Then, when the 2008 financial crisis hits and Americans cut back on luxuries like shrimp, those same farmers are devastated. Their fate is tied more to the whims of American consumers than to their own government's policies. Kevin: Wow. So our appetites, our recessions, our elections—they create tidal waves everywhere else. I remember the book mentions how people in Brussels and cities all over the world were celebrating in the streets when Obama was elected. They felt like it was their election, too. Michael: Precisely. That's imperial power. And this is where Friedman brings in his historical parallel: the Roman Republic. Rome also started as a republic that hated kings, but it grew so powerful that it became an empire. And the central challenge, the one that ultimately destroyed them, was trying to figure out how to run an empire abroad while keeping a republic at home. Kevin: Okay, I can see the danger. Imperial overreach, corruption, endless wars... it can rot a country from the inside out. But Friedman's solution is what gets me. A 'Machiavellian' president? That sounds like you're prescribing poison as the cure. Machiavelli is synonymous with backstabbing, deception, and "the ends justify the means." Michael: And that's the exact misconception Friedman tackles. He argues we've misunderstood Machiavelli. For a leader, Machiavellian virtue isn't about personal goodness or being nice. It's about being cunning, wise, and adaptable. It's the ability to overcome fortune—to handle the unpredictable chaos of the world. Kevin: So it’s not about being evil, it’s about being effective in a world that doesn't play by the rules? Michael: Exactly. Friedman quotes Machiavelli directly: "a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous." The president's job isn't to be a saint; it's to protect the republic from a world full of actors who are not saints. Sometimes that requires making ugly choices, being devious, and using power ruthlessly to achieve a moral end, which is the survival and health of the nation. Kevin: That is a tough pill to swallow. It feels like you're walking a razor's edge. One misstep and you're not a cunning protector, you're just a tyrant. Michael: It is a razor's edge. And that’s why Friedman says the character and wisdom of the president are so critical. But this isn't just a philosophical exercise. He applies this Machiavellian logic to create a grand strategy for the U.S. on the world stage.

Kevin: Alright, so if the president is this master chess player, what are the moves? This is where the book got a lot of criticism for being cynical and U.S.-centric, right? He’s basically advocating for America to manipulate the world. Michael: He is. His core strategic idea is that the U.S. should stop trying to be the world's policeman, which is exhausting and expensive, and start acting like the world's grandmaster. The goal is to maintain a balance of power in key regions so that no single country can become powerful enough to threaten U.S. interests. You don't fight them directly; you make sure they're too busy with their rivals. Kevin: Okay, give me the most controversial examples. Where does he want to apply this strategy? Michael: Let's start with the Middle East. For decades, Friedman says, the U.S. successfully managed the region by playing Iran and Iraq off each other. The Iran-Iraq war in the 80s was a brutal conflict, but from a cold, strategic U.S. perspective, it was perfect. Two major regional threats were bleeding each other dry, leaving them no energy to dominate the Persian Gulf and its oil. Kevin: That is incredibly cynical. But I can see the brutal logic. So what happened? Michael: The 2003 invasion of Iraq. By toppling Saddam Hussein, the U.S. single-handedly destroyed the balance of power. We removed the main check on Iran's influence, and suddenly Iran became the dominant regional power. Friedman argues this was a catastrophic strategic blunder. Kevin: So what's his Machiavellian fix for the mess we created? Michael: This is the bombshell. He argues the U.S. needs to perform a strategic reversal. It needs to seek an accommodation, even a quiet alliance, with Iran. Kevin: Wait, an alliance with Iran? The country we've called the 'Axis of Evil'? The country that chants 'Death to America'? How is that even possible? Michael: He compares it to Roosevelt allying with the murderous dictator Stalin to defeat Hitler, or Nixon allying with Mao's communist China to contain the Soviet Union. Sometimes, you have to ally with a lesser threat to contain a greater one. In this case, the greater threat is regional instability and a single power controlling the world's oil flow. A deal with Iran, however distasteful, would restore the balance. Kevin: My head is spinning. That's a wild idea. What's another move on this grand chessboard? Michael: Let's go to Europe. Friedman's biggest fear there is a potential alliance between Germany and Russia. German capital and technology combined with Russian natural resources and manpower would create a Eurasian behemoth that could dominate the continent and challenge the U.S. globally. Kevin: That does sound like a geopolitical nightmare. So what's the play? Michael: You don't confront them directly. You use a strategic wedge. And that wedge is Poland. Friedman says the U.S. should build an incredibly strong political, economic, and military relationship with Poland. A strong, confident Poland, located right between Germany and Russia, acts as a "bone in the throat" of both. It makes Germany nervous about its eastern flank and complicates any Russian moves westward. It keeps them both off-balance and focused on their neighborhood, not on global domination. Kevin: Wow. So the strategy is to intentionally create tension and anxiety to prevent a larger alliance from forming. It’s like a geopolitical game of Jenga. You're pulling out blocks to make the tower wobbly so no one else can build on top of it. Michael: That's a perfect analogy. It’s proactive and devious, and according to Friedman, far cheaper and more effective than stationing massive armies everywhere. It's about managing power, not just projecting it.

Kevin: Okay, this is all fascinating as a thought experiment. But the book was published in 2010, making predictions for the decade that followed. It's now well past that. So, Michael, let's get out the red pen. How did our geopolitical Magic 8 Ball actually do? Michael: This is the most interesting part, looking back. Let's start with his big call on Russia. He wrote that Russia, feeling encircled by NATO and humiliated after the Soviet collapse, would become increasingly aggressive and seek to re-establish its sphere of influence, particularly in places like Ukraine and Georgia. Kevin: I mean… given the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, I'd say that's a massive, flashing checkmark for Friedman. He absolutely nailed the direction and motivation of Putin's Russia when many in the West were still hoping for a 'reset'. Michael: He really did. He saw the 2008 war in Georgia not as an isolated event, but as the opening shot of Russia's resurgence. Now, what about his other big prediction? China. Kevin: Right, in 2010, everyone was on the 'China is the next superpower' train. The narrative was that their rise was unstoppable. What did Friedman say? Michael: He was a major contrarian. He argued that China was a paper tiger. He pointed to the massive internal inequality—a tiny, wealthy coastal elite and a billion people living in deep poverty inland. He predicted this would lead to immense social and political instability, and that China's biggest challenge wasn't the U.S., but holding itself together. He said it would face a major crisis. Kevin: And looking at China today? With the collapsing property market, the record-high youth unemployment, the crackdown on dissent… he wasn't entirely wrong, was he? China hasn't collapsed, but the narrative of its inevitable, smooth rise to global dominance is looking a lot shakier than it did in 2010. He saw the cracks in the foundation before almost anyone else. Michael: Exactly. He saw the internal fragility as the key factor, not just the GDP numbers. But here's a question for you, Kevin. What about the central character in the book—the Machiavellian U.S. president? Did America follow his advice? Kevin: That’s a clear 'no.' Looking at the last decade-plus, U.S. foreign policy seems to have been a pendulum swinging between different approaches. There was the 'leading from behind' idea, then a more nationalist 'America First' approach, and now a focus on rebuilding alliances. It doesn't feel like there's been a single, cunning, long-term grandmaster strategy. It feels more reactive and, at times, chaotic. Michael: I think that's fair. And Friedman might argue that this lack of a coherent, Machiavellian strategy is why the world feels more unstable. We've been pulled into conflicts and crises because we haven't been ruthlessly managing the global balance of power from a distance. We haven't been playing chess; we've been getting knocked around by the pieces.

Kevin: So, after all this, what's the big takeaway? Is this book a cynical, amoral manual for world domination, or is it a pragmatic, necessary guide for survival in a dangerous world? Michael: I think it’s the latter, but it forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth. The core message is that power is a reality, not a moral choice. The U.S. has immense power. Pretending it doesn't, or trying to wield it only in purely idealistic ways, is naive and, in Friedman's view, ultimately more dangerous because it creates vacuums and chaos. Kevin: So the goal isn't empire for the sake of empire. The goal is to use the unpleasant tools of empire—the cunning, the manipulation, the cold calculations—to protect the values of the republic at home. Michael: That's the great paradox at the heart of the book. To be a good republic, you have to be a smart empire. You have to be willing to engage with the world as it is, not as you wish it were. It requires a maturity from both the president and the public to understand that international politics is not a clean, simple business. Kevin: It really leaves you with a tough question. Can a nation be both powerful and good at the same time? And if it's forced to compromise, how much of its 'goodness' can it sacrifice before it loses its soul? Michael: That's the question every president in this position has to wrestle with. And Friedman's argument is that you have to be willing to get your hands dirty to keep the home front clean. Kevin: It’s a powerful and unsettling idea. We’d love to hear what you all think. Is this Machiavellian approach a brilliant strategy for a complex world, or is it a terrifyingly cynical path to go down? Let us know your thoughts. Michael: This is Aibrary, signing off.