Narrator: In October 1962, the world held its breath. American spy planes discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles from Florida, capable of striking Washington D.C. in minutes. For thirteen agonizing days, President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev stood eyeball-to-eyeball, each with the power to end civilization. Military advisors pushed for immediate airstrikes, an action that could have triggered a full-scale nuclear exchange. Yet, somehow, disaster was averted. Kennedy, haunted by his reading of history and the way European leaders had sleepwalked into World War I, chose a path of careful statecraft, combining a naval blockade with secret negotiations. This near-miss serves as a terrifying reminder of how easily great powers can stumble into catastrophic conflict.

This very danger is the subject of Graham Allison’s book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?. Allison argues that the fundamental stress created when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power has, throughout history, made war not just possible, but likely. The book examines this historical pattern to ask the most urgent geopolitical question of our time: are the United States and China on a collision course for a war that could be even more devastating than the conflicts of the past?

Narrator: The core concept of the book is named after the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who chronicled the devastating Peloponnesian War. He concluded that the conflict was not caused by any single event, but by an unavoidable structural stress. As he famously wrote, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." For half a century, these two city-states had coexisted. But Athens, a democratic and cultural hub with a mighty navy, was growing relentlessly in power and influence. This expansion began to encroach on the interests of Sparta, the established, militaristic land power that had long dominated the Greek world.

Sparta and its allies grew deeply anxious. They saw Athens’s rise not just as a competition, but as an existential threat to their way of life and their position in the world. This fear, combined with Athens's growing confidence and sense of entitlement, created a toxic dynamic. Small disputes, like a conflict over the remote colony of Corcyra or economic sanctions against the city of Megara, became flashpoints. Despite efforts by leaders on both sides to find peaceful resolutions, the underlying pressures of fear, honor, and interest proved too strong. The Spartan Assembly ultimately voted for war, not out of aggression, but out of fear of Athens's unchecked growth. The resulting three-decade war shattered both city-states and ended the golden age of Greece. Allison argues this "Thucydides's Trap" is a recurring pattern, with his research identifying 16 such cases in the last 500 years, 12 of which ended in war.

Narrator: To understand the modern Thucydidean challenge, one must grasp the sheer scale and speed of China's ascent. Allison quotes the late Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, who called China "the biggest player in the history of the world." This is not hyperbole. In 1980, China's economy was less than 10% the size of America's. By 2015, it had reached 61%, and on the measure of purchasing power parity, a benchmark many economists believe better reflects real economic might, China had already surpassed the United States.

This transformation is visible on the ground. Consider the city of Shenzhen. In 1980, it was a poor collection of fishing villages with a population of 30,000. After being designated a Special Economic Zone, it exploded. Today, it is a gleaming megacity of over 12 million, home to global tech giants like Huawei and Tencent, with real estate prices rivaling Silicon Valley. This story is a microcosm of the entire nation. In a single generation, China has lifted over half a billion people out of extreme poverty, an achievement the World Bank called "the greatest leap to overcome poverty in history." This economic miracle has fueled a massive military modernization and a growing global influence that now directly challenges the American-led world order.

Narrator: China's ambition is driven by President Xi Jinping's vision of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." This is not about creating something new, but about restoring China to what its leaders see as its historical position of prominence. For centuries, China viewed itself as the "Middle Kingdom," the center of civilization to which other nations paid tribute. This worldview was shattered during the "century of humiliation," from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, when Western powers and Japan carved up China, imposed unequal treaties, and plundered its wealth.

This period of victimhood is a deep scar on the national psyche and a powerful motivator for the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping's "China Dream" is a promise to erase this humiliation and make China strong, respected, and whole again. This involves reestablishing control over territories it considers its own, like Taiwan and the South China Sea, and commanding deference from its neighbors and respect from other great powers. Xi, who himself endured immense hardship during the Cultural Revolution, is a leader of immense resolve. He is determined to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, which he believes collapsed due to ideological decay and a lack of firm control. His vision is therefore a potent mix of restoring historical glory and ensuring the absolute primacy of the Communist Party.

Narrator: Before judging China’s assertive behavior, Allison argues that Americans should examine their own history. As the United States rose to power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it acted with similar, if not greater, assertiveness. Under President Theodore Roosevelt, the U.S. was driven by a belief in its own "manifest destiny" and civilizational superiority. Roosevelt believed that "all the great masterful races have been fighting races" and that America had a right to dominate its hemisphere.

This was not just talk. Roosevelt instigated the Spanish-American War to expel Spain from Cuba, acquiring Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines in the process. When Germany sent warships to Venezuela in 1902, Roosevelt threatened war and forced them to back down, enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. Most famously, when Colombia refused to grant the U.S. rights to build a canal, Roosevelt supported an insurrection, created the new nation of Panama, and secured the canal zone. As he later boasted, "I took the Isthmus." This history serves as a powerful reminder that rising powers are inherently disruptive. If China were to behave as the U.S. did during its rise, the world would be in for a turbulent period.

Narrator: Despite the grim historical odds, Allison insists that war is not inevitable. History also offers clues for peace. The book identifies four cases where the Thucydides Trap was avoided, providing lessons for today's leaders. For instance, the "Great Rapprochement" between a rising United States and a ruling Britain at the turn of the 20th century shows the power of accommodation. Facing a more immediate threat from Germany, Britain’s wily statesmen chose to make concessions to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, cultivating a "special relationship" that would prove vital in two world wars.

Another crucial factor is the existence of nuclear weapons. The Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the most intense rivalry in history, yet it never turned into a direct hot war. The reason was Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. Both sides understood that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. This reality forced a level of restraint and communication, even during crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis, that was absent in previous rivalries. Other clues include thick economic interdependence, which raises the cost of war, and the critical importance of domestic performance. Ultimately, a nation's strength abroad is a reflection of its health and vitality at home.

Narrator: The central takeaway from Destined for War is that while the structural stresses of the Thucydides Trap are real and dangerous, they do not make war a certainty. History is not destiny. The outcome of the U.S.-China rivalry will be determined not by an iron law of history, but by the choices made in Washington and Beijing. Human agency is the decisive variable.

The book leaves us with a profound challenge. Avoiding war will require a level of strategic imagination, mutual understanding, and painful adjustment that is rarely seen in statecraft. It demands that leaders on both sides clarify their vital interests, understand their adversary's perspective, and prioritize the immense challenge of fixing their own domestic problems. The most important question is not whether the U.S. and China are destined for war, but whether today’s leaders possess the wisdom and courage to steer their nations toward peace.